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INTRODUCTION

In the typical insurance contract, the primary carrier not only
agrees to pay an adverse judgment against the insured up to the
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policy limits, but also agrees to provide a defense for the insured.'
The primary carrier also generally reserves the right to control the
settlement of the claim. 2 Because of the dire consequences of a lawsuit against the insured, the primary carrier is charged with a duty to
act with due care in regard to the settlement of the suit to protect the
insured from a verdict in excess of the primary policy limits. 3 If the
primary carrier negligently refuses to accept a settlement offer or to
negotiate a settlement, it may be liable to the insured for a verdict
even though such verdict exceeds the limits of the primary policy.'
Whether under similar circumstances the primary carrier may be
liable to an excess insurance carrier for the amount of the verdict
beyond the primary policy limits is a question yet to be addressed by
Texas courts.
This article will discuss case law in other jurisdictions which recognizes a cause of action in favor of an excess insurance carrier
against a primary carrier for wrongful failure to settle a claim
against the insured. Additionally, the article suggests a logical standard of proof and measure of damages which could be adopted by a
Texas court when presented with such a case. Finally, this article
sets forth a practical approach for litigants involved in such an
action.
II.

RECOGNIZING A CAUSE OF ACTION IN FAVOR OF AN EXCESS
INSURANCE CARRIER AGAINST

A

PRIMARY CARRIER

FOR WRONGFUL FAILURE To SETTLE

A.

Other Jurisdictions

The majority of jurisdictions which have considered this issue recognize a cause of action in favor of an excess carrier against a primary carrier for wrongfully failing to settle within the primary
1. See, e.g., Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Minn. 1979)
(insurer's duty to defend broader than duty to indemnify); Spitler v. State Auto. Mut., Inc.,
400 N.E.2d 889, 892 (Ohio 1980) (duty to defend insured); Sloan Const. Co. v. Central Nat'l

Ins. Co., 236 S.E.2d 818, 821 (S.C. 1977) (insurer has duty to defend insured).
2. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Schropp, 567 P.2d 1359, 1365 (Kan. 1977).
3. See Manieri v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 1247, 1248 (La. Ct. App.
1977).
4. See Hodges v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 488 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (D.S.C.
1980).
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policy limits.' Consequently, a primary carrier may not shift the
entire risk of the excess loss to the excess carrier by its own negligent
conduct in settling the suit. Most courts reason that since there is a
duty to protect the insured from an excess verdict, there should not
be a different result merely because the insured purchases excess insurance.6 Further, allowing the excess carrier to recover the amount
of the excess verdict from a primary carrier that wrongfully refuses
to settle should provide an incentive that will promote more efficient
settlement of claims.' One of the few jurisdictions that does not recognize a cause of action in favor of the excess carrier is the state of
Arizona.' Although stating that the primary carrier owes a duty to
the insured to settle claims within the policy limits, the Arizona
Supreme Court refused to extend this duty to the excess carrier in
the absence of privity of contract between the primary carrier and
the excess carrier. 9
B.

Texas

There are no Texas decisions which squarely deal with the issue
of whether the excess carrier has a cause of action against the primary carrier for wrongful failure to settle a claim. Texas has long
5. See, e.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So. 2d 272, 274-76 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (excess carrier may sue primary carrier under theory of equitable subrogation); Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 1976) (excess carrier subrogated to rights of insured in action against primary carrier); Centennial Ins.
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1980) (excess carrier entitled to sue
primary carrier for breach of duty to settle). See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R. 4th, 881-82
(1981) (collection of jurisdictions recognizing such an action).
6. See Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Peter
v. Travelers Ins., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974)). In Valentine, the court explained
the fact that "an excess insurer may recover fom the primary [carrier] for a breach of duty
does not increase the duty or the liability of the primary [carrier]. Under the doctrine of
equitable subrogation, the duty owed an excess insurer is identical to that owed the insured."
Id at 298.
7. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Minn.
1976). The court in ContinentalCasualty noted that disallowing such an action "imperils the
public and judicial interests in fair and reasonable settlements of lawsuits." Id at 864-65.
8. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 433 P.2d 966, 968
(Ariz. 1967).
9. See id at 968. In Universal linderwriters,the excess carrier had to step in and defend
the insured when the primary carrier wrongfully refused to do so. The excess carrier settled
the lawsuit outside the limits of the primary policy. The court allowed the excess carrier to
recover from the primary carrier the limit of the primary policy, but did not permit recovery
of the entire settlement amount. See id. at 968.
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recognized, however, an action in favor of the insured against the
primary carrier for failing to settle within the policy limits.' 0 In the
landmark case of GA. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity
Co.," the Texas Supreme Court allowed a suit by the insured
against the primary carrier where the primary carrier was negligent
in failing to accept a settlement offer within the policy limits. 12 In
Stowers, the court reasoned that since the primary carrier contractually assumes the responsibility for and control of the defense and
settlement of the claim, it becomes the agent of the insured in that
regard.' 3 The court would not permit the primary carrier to gamble
on the outcome of the lawsuit by negligently refusing to settle and,
thereby, shift the risk of the excess loss to the insured.' 4 Consequently, the imposition of this duty on the primary carrier is known
as the "Stowers Doctrine." Under the "Stowers Doctrine," the primary carrier is liable to the insured if it is negligent in refusing to
5
settle a lawsuit againt the insured. '
Texas courts, however, have yet to decide whether to recognize a
cause of action against the primary carrier in favor of the excess
carrier for wrongfully failing to settle the lawsuit. Such a cause of
action will probably be allowed for several reasons. As previously
noted, the great majority of jurisdictions which have considered the
question have approved the cause of action. In this regard, it is significant that the rationale for recognizing a cause of action in favor
of excess carriers is similar to that advanced by Texas courts when
allowing an insured to assert such a claim.' 6 Those courts approv10. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex. 1971) (insured

allowed to sue primary carrier for breach of duty to settle); Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 152 Tex. 534, 535-36, 260 S.W.2d 884, 885, 887 (1953) (insured brought
action against primary carrier for negligently refusing to settle); Rosell v. Farmers Tex.
County Mut. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.2d 278, 279-80 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ)
("Stowers Doctrine" permits insured to recover entire amount of judgment against primary
insurer if latter negligently refuses to settle).
11. 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
12. See id at 548.
13. See id at 547.
14. See id at 547-48.
15. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 91, 92, 95 (Tex. 1971) (requiring proof of negligence on behalf of insurer); Rosell v. Farmers Tex, County Mut. Ins.
Co., 642 S.W.2d 278, 279-80 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ); Wood Truck Leasing,
Inc. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975,
no writ) (insurer liable upon proof of its negligent failure to settle).
16. Compare Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415,
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ing the cause of action reason that since the primary carrier usually
reserves the right to control settlement, the primary carrier has a
duty to act with due care in considering a settlement to protect both
the insured and the excess carrier from an excess verdict. 7 Additionally, the imposition of a duty on the primary carrier will provide
an incentive to the primary carrier to settle claims. 8 The same reasoning which permits an action in favor of the insured, therefore,
should be applicable to and provide the rationale for Texas courts to
permit an action by the excess carrier against the primary carrier. 19
It seems highly unlikely that Texas courts would follow the minority view which disallows the action based on the lack of privity
between the primary carrier and the excess carrier. The doctrine of
privity of contract has steadily eroded to such a point in Texas that
it is seldom relied upon to deny a third party the right to sue the
wrongdoer, especially when the action is both contract and tort in
nature. 20 For example, in Nobility Homes of Texas v. Shivers,2' the
425 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (primary carrier may not shift risk of loss to excess carrier)
with G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved) (negligence on part of primary carrier in failing to
settle shifts risk of loss to insured).
17. See Smith v. Transit Casualty Co., 281 F. Supp. 661, 664 (E.D. Tex. 1968), afl'd,
410 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1969); Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222, 233 (N.D.
Tex. 1963), afid in part, rev'd in part, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965).
18. See Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 298 (9th Cir. 1977); Continental
Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.w.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 1976); see also INSURANCE,
EXCESS AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 321 (Ostrager ed. 1983) (relieving primary
carrier of duty to settle causes disinclination to settle).
19. Cf Peter v. Travelers Ins., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974). In Peter, the
court noted that "[u]nder the doctrine of equitable subrogation, the duty owed an excess
insurer is identical to that owed the insured. The excess [carrier] will not be able to force the
primary [carrier] into accepting any settlement which his duty to the insured would not
require accepting ..
" Id at 1350; see also Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 297
(9th Cir. 1977) (excess carrier assumes rights and obligations of insured).
20. See, e.g., Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. 1983) (no privity
requirement in action based on negligence and breach of implied warranty by purchaser of
used house); Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tex. 1981) (no privity
needed for action under Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act); Garcia v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456, 465 (Tex. 1980) (privity not required to assert personal injury claim in
action on breach of implied warranty). Inroads are also being made on the requirement of
privity in actions based upon an express warranty. See Indust-Ri-Chem v. Par-Pak Co., 602
S.w.2d 282, 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (dispensing with privity requirement in action based upon breach of express warranty by sample); see also Basin Operating
Co. v. Valley Steel Prods., 620 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Barthlow v. Metcalf, 594 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979,
writ dism'd).
21. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
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Texas Supreme Court abolished the requirement of privity of contract in a breach of implied warranty action.22 Claiming the absence
of privity of contract in an action by the excess carrier against the
primary carrier, therefore, should not constitute a viable basis for
denying such an action.
In some jurisdictions, the basis for allowing a cause of action in
favor of the excess carrier is the fact that courts imply in the insurance contract a covenant of good faith on the part of the primary
carrier to protect the policyholder or excess carrier from an excess
verdict.23 Recently, the Texas Supreme Court refused to imply a
covenant of good faith in the performance of a contract.24 It could
be argued, therefore, that if the implied covenant is the basis for the
suit against the primary carrier and Texas does not recognize such a
covenant, it should not recognize a right of recovery by the excess
carrier against the primary carrier. The cause of action in Texas,
however, is not based upon a covenant of fair dealing implied from
the insurance contract. Such action is premised instead upon tort
concepts. 25 Thus, Texas will probably follow the majority view and
permit an action by an excess carrier against the primary carrier.
III.

STANDARD OF PROOF: NEGLIGENCE OR BAD FAITH?

If Texas should in the future recognize a cause of action in favor
of the excess carrier, then courts must determine the standard of
proof for establishing liability against the primary carrier. There
are at least two alternatives: bad faith or negligence. Although negligence appears to be the logical choice under existing law, the adoption of a "bad faith" standard would be a fairer and more equitable
rule in actions by the excess carrier. A determination as to the
proper standard of proof requires a review of cases involving actions
22. See id at 81.
23. See Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038,
1040, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 711 (1980); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 367 A.2d
864, 869 (N.J. 1976).
24. See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983). Although the English
decision did not involve an action brought under the "Stowers Doctrine," it could be cited
for the proposition that Texas should not recognize an action in favor of the excess carrier
because there are no implied covenants of fair dealing in insurance contracts. See id.
25. See Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 91, 93-94 (Tex. 1971) (action
based on primary carrier's negligent conduct); Rosell v. Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co.,
642 S.W.2d 278, 279-80 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ) (action based on negligence).
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brought by the insured and also cases from other jurisdictions which
have permitted such actions by excess carriers.
A. Actions by the Insured
In suits initiated by the insured, the jurisdictions are divided as to
the standard of proof required to establish liability. A slight majority require proof of bad faith on the part of the primary carrier in
refusing to settle the suit. 26 A minority of jurisdictions, including
Texas, appear to require only proof of negligence.27 Since Texas is
among the minority of jurisdictions which require an insured to
prove negligence by the primary carrier in refusing to settle, 28 it
could be argued the same standard should be applied in actions by
excess carriers. 29 Further, argument could be made that the negligence standard should be adopted because there is little practical
difference between the standards of negligence and good faith. For
example, applying Texas law in an action by the insured, a federal
court held that although the insured was only required to prove negligence, the primary carrier was entitled to an instruction which
would blur the distinction between negligence and bad faith. 30 This
instruction informed the jury that in considering the primary carrier's negligence for failure to settle, the primary carrier may take
into consideration the interest of the insurance company as well as
that of the insured, under all of the facts and circumstances known or
26. See, e.g., Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744,

748, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1975) (proof of bad faith on part of primary insurer); Gordon v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55, 334 N.Y.S.2d 691, 696-97 (N.Y. 1972)

(proof of bad faith required), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973); State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 427 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tenn. 1968) (proof of bad faith on part of primary carrier).
27. See, e.g., Knudsen v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 222 A.2d 811, 812 (Conn.
C.P. 1966) (requiring proof of negligence); Thomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 177 S.E.2d
286, 288 (N.C. 1970) (proof of negligence required); G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved) (requiring
proof of negligence).
28. See Rosell v. Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ).
29. Cf. Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1977). In Valentine,
the court stated that the primary insurer's duty to the insured was identical to the duty it
owed to an excess insurer. See id at 298. Upon breach of this duty, the excess insurer is
subrogated to the rights of the insured. See id. at 297. It would seem logical, therefore, that
the standard of proof for its breach would be the same for both the insured and the excess
carrier.
30. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 1959).
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reasonably available to the insurance company, its agents or attorneys, at the time the offer of settlement was made by [the plaintiffs] at
the opening of the trial of the State Court action ."
Such an instruction permits the primary carrier to consider its own
interests and not only the interests of the insured or excess carrier
when determining whether to settle the suit. With this instruction,
there may be very little difference in the proof offered to show either
negligence or bad faith.32
Despite these contentions, the adoption of a bad faith standard
would be more equitable in actions initiated by the excess carrier.
The limiting instruction does not alter the fact that the issue of liability is a fact question for the jury to decide. In this regard, negligence is easier to prove than bad faith. To a juror, bad faith may
connote a state of mind similar to dishonesty, whereas negligence
may only infer carelessness. Further, the more stringent bad faith
rule should be adopted because the excess carriers are more sophisticated in litigation matters than the typical insured, and consequently, do not require the same degree of protection. Additionally,
the fact that excess carriers are voluntarily writing such coverages to
seek a profit with full knowledge of the risks involved mandates the
adoption of a more rigorous standard. It would be inequitable to
permit the excess carrier to earn its profit with full knowledge of the
attendant risks and then be permitted to shift the entire excess loss
to a primary carrier upon proof of the less stringent standard of
negligence.
B. Actions By the Excess Carrier

The adoption of a bad faith standard in Texas finds additional
support in the fact that most jurisdictions which permit an action by
the excess carrier also require proof of bad faith on the part of the
primary carrier in refusing to settle.33 Unlike Texas, however, most
of these jurisdictions follow the majority "bad faith" rule in actions
3 1. Id at 475 n. 1.
32. See Holmes, Third Party Insurance Excess Liability and Its Avoidance, 34 ARK. L.
REv. 525, 534-36 (1981).
33. See, e.g., Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 579 F.2d 514, 515 (9th Cir.

1978) (Oregon law requires proof of bad faith in action by excess carrier); Valentine v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 297-98 (9th Cir. 1977) (California law requires proof of bad

faith on part of excess carrier); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 389 So. 2d 272, 275
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (requires bad faith on part of excess carrier).
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brought by the insured.34 One might conclude that there would be
no logical reason for a Texas court to require proof of bad faith in
an action by the excess carrier when the insured in a similar case
must only show negligence. 5 As previously noted, however, the
substantially different degree of sophistication regarding litigation
that an excess carrier possesses compels the adoption of a different
standard. For example, the excess carrier has trained claims personnel and vast experience in litigation which render it far more capable than the typical insured in evaluating settlements and, therefore,
less in need of protection. Another critical point to note is that such
a claim is based upon equitable subrogation and, therefore, is governed by principles of equity.36 Accordingly, there is a sense of unfairness in permitting an excess carrier to profit from the excess
insurance contract by shifting its entire risk to the primary carrier
upon proof of mere negligence on the part of the primary carrier.
For these reasons, if the Texas courts recognize a claim on behalf of
the excess carrier they should require proof of bad faith on the part
of the primary carrier for failing to settle a claim against the
insured.37
IV.

TYPES OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE

It is easy to predict that a primary carrier which considers only its
own interests in refusing to settle will be liable for an excess judgment. It is equally easy to predict the non-liability of a primary
carrier which considers only the interests of the insured. Most cases
are more difficult to predict because the primary carrier's conduct
falls between these extremes. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Robb,38
the Fifth Circuit held that a primary carrier need not consider only
34. See, e.g., Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744,

748, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1975) (requiring bad faith in action by insured); Boston Old
Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980); Groce v. Fidelity Gen. Ins.

Co., 448 P.2d 554, 561 (Or. 1968) (insurer must prove bad faith of primary carrier).
35. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
36. See Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415, 426
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Home Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 327 N.Y.S.2d 745, 748, (N.Y. Sup.

Ct.), aff'd, 332 N.Y.S.2d 1003-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
37. See Holmes, Third Party InsuranceExcess Liabilityand Its A oidance, 34 ARK. L.

REV. 525, 535-38 (1981) (advocating unified standard of liability in actions by both insureds
and excess insurers).
38. 267 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1959).
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the interests of the insured, but may also take into account its own
interests in determining whether to settle the suit against the
insured.39
There are several factors that aid in predicting the potential liability of the primary carrier that refuses to settle a claim resulting in an
excess verdict. Perhaps the most important considerations in determining the liability of the primary carrier are whether there is a
substantial likelihood that the claimant will establish liability, and
40
whether the potential damages will exceed the policy limits.
Where there is a strong possibility of an adverse verdict, i.e., where
the chances of liability exceed fifty percent and the probability of a
damage award in excess of the primary policy limits is Substantial,
then the primary carrier is charged with the duty to exercise ordinary care and/or good faith in attempting to settle the case.4 '
An analysis of case law involving actions by both the insured and
the excess carrier indicates that the foreseeable liability of the insured and the probability of a substantial excess verdict are critical.
In an action by the insured, the court in Highway Insurance Underwriters v. Lu/kin-Beaumont Motor Coaches4 2 held that liability facts,
which favored the injured person, and damages, which were likely
to exceed the policy limits, were important factors in determining
the primary carrier's liability.43 Similarily, in Smith v. Transit Casualty Co.,44 the district court held that a primary carrier was negligent in failing to accept a settlement offer within the policy limits
where there was a high probability of an excess verdict.45
An analysis of cases initiated by the excess carrier also indicates
that these two factors are important in evaluating the potential liability of the primary carrier. For example, in Valentine v. Aetna Insurance Co., 41 where the likelihood of an excess verdict was
39. See id at 476.
40. See Lienemann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Fire & Casualty Co., 540 F.2d 333, 340

(8th Cir. 1976); Ward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 539 F.2d 1044, 1049 (5th Cir. 1976).
41. See Gibbs v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423, 426-27 (9th Cir. 1976);

Hodges v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 488 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (D.S.C. 1980).
42. 215 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. See id at 928-29.
44. 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tex. 1968).
45. See id. at 670. The Smith case involved a wrongful death action with serious damage potential. The insured had negligently crossed into the decedent's lane of traffic and
there was no evidence of contributory negligence. See id. at 670.
46. 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977).
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substantial, the court permitted an excess carrier to recover the difference between the amount paid in settlement after the verdict and
the amount for which the case should have settled before the verdict.47 Likewise, in Fireman'sFund Insurance Co. v. Security Insurance Co., 48 there was a substantial probability that an excess verdict
might reach $400,000 in a malpractice claim.49 Consequently, the
court held that there was bad faith on the part of the primary carrier
that refused to attempt a settlement negotiation following a settlement offer of $147,000.50 Finally, in PortlandGeneralElectric Co. v.
Pacific Indemnity Co., 5 the court held that there was bad faith on
the part of the primary carrier in refusing to accept a settlement
offer of $125,000 where a workman was severely burned and the
defense attorney predicted an adverse verdict of up to $400,000.52
In defending a primary carrier in such an action, the most difficult
fact is that the case against him has already been lost and a substantial excess verdict rendered against the insured. After the lawsuit, it
is not difficult for the excess carrier to contend that there was a substantial probability of an adverse excess verdict which should have
been foreseeable to the primary carrier. The conduct of the primary
carrier will not be judged upon hindsight but rather upon the facts
53
known to the primary carrier at the time that it refused to settle.
The primary carrier, therefore, should seek to develop evidence
which indicates that the facts known to it at the time that it refused
to settle supported the view that there was a better than even chance
of winning the lawsuit or at least minimizing the award of damages
to an amount within the primary policy limits. 4
Other evidence which should be developed in the defense of the
primary carrier include facts which show that the investigation and
opinions of defense counsel suggested that the insured would win

47. See id at 296-98.
48. 367 A.2d 864 (N.J. 1976).
49. See id.at 866.
50. See id at 866-67.
51. 574 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1978).
52. See id.at 473-74.
53. See Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224, 226-27 (D. Kan. 1978); Austero v. National
Casualty Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 653, 672 (Ct. App. 1978).

54. See Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038, 1041
(Cal. 1980); Shelton v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 396 So. 2d 1379, 1383 (La Ct.
App. 1981).
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the case or the damage award would be within policy limits. 55 For
in Centennial Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
example,
Co., 56 an excess carrier failed in its effort to impose liability upon a
primary carrier for an excess verdict.5 1 In that case, the court concluded that the investigation by the primary carrier was adequate.
Further, although the primary carrier rejected a settlement offer
within the policy limits, the court considered its counter-offer higher
than what was considered a reasonable offer. 58 This case is illustrative of the fact that the primary carrier is not strictly liable for judgments which exceed the policy limit.5 9. Thus, in cases where there is
a substantial probability of an excess verdict against the insured, the
liability of the primary carrier for the excess verdict will depend on
its efforts to settle the case. 61 In such instances, counsel should consider introducing evidence indicating the primary carrier's efforts to
settle the case. 6 ' Additional factors which are relevant to the liability issue in an action against the primary carrier include the primary
carrier's investigation and efforts to ascertain facts 62 and its reliance
on or rejection of the advice of its attorney.63 Further, counsel
should consider facts indicating that the primary carrier rejected an
offer to settle after a verdict had been rendered against the insured.64
Finally, evidence should be relevant if it shows the primary carrier's
efforts to inform the insured of a compromise offer 65 or its misrepre55. See Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevethan, 390 So. 2d 724, 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (reliance by primary carrier on advice of its counsel is evidence on bad faith
issue).
56. 404 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1980).
57. See id. at 763.

58. See id at 762-63.
59. See, e.g., Austero v. National Casualty Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 653, 672 (Ct. App. 1978)

(mere failure to settle claim alone is not basis for liability); Edwins v. General Casualty Co.,
397 N.E.2d 1231, 1232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (failure to settle within policy limits does not of

itself impose liability on primary carrier); Champion v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 352 So. 2d
737, 740 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (primary carrier not strictly liable for failure to settle claim
within policy limits).
60. See Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224, 237-38 (D. Kan. 1978) (focus on insurer's
efforts to settle claim); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.E.2d 759, 762-63

(Ohio 1980) (focus on primary carrier's negotiations to settle claim).
61. See Kriz v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 496, 500 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
62. See Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980).

63. See Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevethan, 390 So. 2d 724, 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).
64. See Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Kan. 1978).
65. See id.; Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980).
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sentation of facts which induced the insured to reject a settlement
offer.66
V.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES

In an action by the excess carrier against the primary carrier, the
proper measure of damages depends upon whether there was a firm
offer to settle the suit against the insured. In instances where the
primary carrier wrongfully rejects an offer to settle within the policy
limits, courts uniformly permit the excess carrier to recover the entire amount of the excess verdict that it was required to pay. 67
Where there is no offer within the policy limits, the measure of damages is the difference between the amount paid by the excess carrier
and what it should have contributed had the primary carrier properly settled the claim.68
The following hypothetical demonstrates the measure of damages
in both instances. While operating a truck, the insured collides with
an oncoming vehicle and causes the deaths of two individuals.
Their survivors file a lawsuit seeking $3,000,000 in actual and punitive damages resulting from the insured's negligence and gross negligence in causing the collision. The insured has primary coverage
of $300,000 pursuant to a general liability policy, and a policy of
excess liability insurance with a limit of $5,000,000. The insured
had a poor driving record and denied seeing the oncoming vehicle
before he turned in front of it, causing the accident. There is some
evidence that the oncoming vehicle was being driven at an excessive
rate of speed. Two variations on this hypothetical situation will be
considered. First, the plaintiffs make an offer to settle within the
$300,000 limits of the primary policy; and second, the plaintiffs
make an offer to settle for $550,000. In both instances, assume that
the primary carrier refuses these offers and the case is tried and lost
66. See Covil v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Kan. 1978).
67. See, e.g., Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 574 F.2d 469, 474 (9th Cir.

1978) (recovery of entire excess verdict); Norhtwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group,
143 Cal. Rptr. 415, 429-30 (Ct. App. 1978) (entire amount of verdict recoverable even if in

excess of primary carrier's policy); Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238
N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 1976) (primary carrier may be liable for amount exceeding policy if

wrongfully rejects settlement offer).
68. See Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1977); Continental

Casualty Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384, 391 (N.D. Cal.
1981).
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resulting in a verdict against the insured of $1,000,000. The excess
carrier pays the excess verdict and sues the primary carrier for
$700,000.
Under the first variation of the hypothetical involving the rejection of a settlement offer within the policy limits, the excess carrier
should recover its entire $700,000 payment since the primary carrier
had the opportunity to settle but wrongfully refused to accept the
offer of settlement. The appropriate measure of damages in the second hypothetical is a bit more complex. The answer is suggested in
the extremely well-reasoned opinion of Continental Casualty Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity& Guaranty Co.6 9 In that case, the
parties would not settle within the primary policy limits and the primary carrier was found to have acted negligently or in bad faith by
failing to settle.70 The court held that the measure of damages
would be the difference between the amount paid by the excess carrier to discharge the judgment and the amount it would have been
required to contribute to the settlement.7 ' Under the second hypothetical, the excess carrier paid $700,000 to discharge the judgment,
but would have been required to contribute $250,000 to a settlement
had one been made. The measure of damages is therefore $450,000.
It should be noted that when defending a case where the plaintiff
will not settle within policy limits, it will always be a defense to
show that the excess carrier would not have contributed sufficient
funds to secure the settlement.72 It should be a complete defense to
the primary carrier in the second hypothetical if it can show that the
excess carrier would not have contributed the $250,000 necessary to
accomplish the settlement.73
VI.

DEFENSE OF THE PRIMARY CARRIER

A. No Firm Offer To Settle Within Policy Limits
A review of cases involving actions initiated by the insured and
by the excess carrier indicates that it is not a complete defense for
the primary carrier to claim that there was no offer of settlement
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

516 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
See id. at 390.
See id. at 391.
See id.at 392.
See id. at 392.
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within the primary policy limits.74 In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Robb,75 a case arising out of Texas and initiated by the insured, the
court rejected an argument that the primary insurance carrier could
not be7 held liable in the absence of a settlement offer within policy
limits. 6 Several cases initiated by excess insurance companies reach
the same result. In North River Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
MarineInsurance Co., " the court held that a primary carrier owes a
duty to the excess carrier to seek a settlement within the policy limits.78 Additionally, the court stated that, in a serious case, the primary carrier may owe a duty to contribute to the policy limits. At
the very least, the primary carrier should inform the excess carrier of
settlement offers and seek its contributions to a settlement. 79 In General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. American Casualty
Co., 80 a wrongful death action against the insured resulted in a verdict which exceeded the primary policy limits. 8' In that case, the
primary carrier did not receive an offer to settle within the policy
limits, and the defense counsel thought it was probable that a verdict would exceed the primary policy limits. 8 2 Entering judgment
for the excess carrier, the court noted that the majority of cases do
not require an offer within pblicy limits to hold the primary carrier
liable for failure to negotiate a settlement.8 3 Consequently, it appears that the primary carrier has a continuing duty to negotiate a
settlement even in the absence of an offer to settle. 84 The absence of
such an offer, however, may be used in the defense of the primary
carrier to show that the primary carrier made a diligent or good
faith, although unsuccessful, effort to settle the claim. 5
74. See Davis v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 370 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
75. 267 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1959).
76. See id at 476.
77. 600 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1979).
78. See id at 722.
79. See id. at 724.
80. 390 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
81. See id. at 762-63.
82. See id at 763-64.
83. See id at 765.
84. See Chancey v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 336 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1960, no writ).
85. See Globe Indem. Co. v. Gen-Aero, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1970, no writ). In Gen-Aero, the court stated that one factor to consider in
determining the liability of the primary carrier is its opportunity to settle the case during the
investigation or trial. See id. at 208.
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Settlement by the Insured

The clear weight of authority indicates that the excess carrier may
settle the claim against the insured and then sue the primary carrier.86 In Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co., 87 the
court noted that the excess carrier may settle a claim prior to verdict
and later sue the primary carrier for a failure to settle the claim.88
Similarly, the fact that the excess carrier settled the case after the
verdict without the primary carrier's consent is not a complete defense to the primary carrier. 89 The non-consenting primary carrier,
however, may later show at its trial that the settlement was not just
or fair.9"
C.

Conduct of the Primary Carrier

When the primary carrier refuses an offer within the policy limits,
the focus shifts to the primary carrier's reason for refusing to settle.
Facts must be developed which tend to support the decision to try
the case. For example, it should be shown where possible that there
was a greater than fifty percent probability of either prevailing on
the liability issue or that the damages would not exceed the primary
policy limits. 9' These conclusions are supported by facts revealed
by the investigation, facts surrounding the accident, the contributory
negligence of the claimant, mitigating factors favoring the insured,
reliance upon the advice of an attorney, and knowledge and concurrence of the insured and excess carrier in the rejection of settlement.92 The defendant should request an instruction that the
86. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn.
1976); Western Pac. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 416 P.2d 468, 469, 472 (Wash. 1966).

87. 238 N.W. 2d 862 (Minn. 1976).
88. See id at 865.

89. See Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Home Ins.
Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 327 N.Y.S.2d 745, 747-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).

90. Cf Continental Casualty Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 184 Cal. Rptr. 583, 587-88 (Ct.
App. 1982).
91. See McCall v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 501 S.W.2d 223, 224-25
(Ark. 1973) (primary carrier held not negligent where probability of excess verdict was

"close question"); Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038,

1040, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 711 (Cal. 1980) (primary carrier liable for not settling within policy

limits where substantial liklihood of recovery in excess of policy limits).
92. See Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Kan. 1978).
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primary carrier is entitled to consider not only the interests of the
insured and the excess carrier, but also its own interests in refusing a
settlement.93 Where there is a rejection of an offer within the policy
limits, a substantial verdict generally proves to be a very formidable
obstacle to the primary carrier. In such instances, the primary carrier is faced with the task of trying to persuade a jury after the verdict that this same verdict was not reasonably foreseeable to the
primary carrier prior to verdict. This task may prove impossible.
Nevertheless, the conduct of the primary carrier is not to be judged
with the benefit of hindsight, but rather based upon the facts known
by and available to the primary carrier at the time the decision was
made to reject the settlement offer.94
In a case where the settlement amount is in excess of the primary
limits, the primary carrier can always prove that the excess carrier
would not have contributed sufficient funds toward the settlement
which constitutes a complete defense to the action. In Continental
Casualty Co. v. UnitedStates Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 95 the primary
carrier argued that the excess carrier's failure to contribute to settlement should also support the submission of an issue of contributory
negligence or failure to mitigate damages.96 In rejecting this contention, the court noted that the measure of damages assumes these
issues and the excess carrier has no duty to contribute until the primary policy limits are exhausted. 97 It seems logical that if the excess
carrier acts negligently in failing to contribute to a settlement which
exceeds the primary limits, there should be a proportionate reduction of the excess carrier's recovery against the primary carrier.
It is less clear to what extent equitable defenses will apply in such
an action. The legal premise for the excess carrier's right to sue the
primary carrier is not based on contract, but rather on an equitable
subrogation theory.98 It would be logical to assume, therefore, that
the equitable defenses and maxims such as laches, unjust enrichment, and unclean hands should be applied by a court in equity. 99
93. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473, 476 (5th Cir. 1959).
94. See Covill v. Phillips, 452 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Kan. 1978).
95. 516 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
96. See id at 392.
97. See id at 393.
98. See Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 296-98 (9th Cir. 1977); Vencill v.
Continental Casualty Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (S.D.W. Va. 1977).
99. But see Continental Casualty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 516 F.
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Finally, the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the
judgment becomes final or is paid by the primary or excess
carrier. 100
The successful defense of the primary carrier begins prior to the
excess verdict. The attorney assigned to the defense of the insured
should be permitted to conduct a reasonable and necessary investigation to successfully defend the insured. If there are conflicts as to
the coverage of the policy, these conflicts should be resolved first by
a declaratory judgment. Alternatively, the claim should be settled
first and issues concerning the coverage of the policy resolved later
because an honest but erroneous belief by the primary carrier that
the claim was not covered by the primary policy is not a defense in
The primary carrier is strictly
the action by the excess carrier.'
liable, therefore, for its rejection of settlement offers because of its
unilateral erroneous coverage decision even when attributable to an
honest mistake. 0 2 The primary carrier should offer the services of
its agents and defense attorney to make complete disclosure to the
insured and to the excess carrier of all the facts pertaining to liability and settlement. If the case warrants, the primary carrier should
consider offering its policy limits in settlement and requesting the
excess carrier and/or the insured to contribute to a settlement.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Texas courts will probably recognize a cause of action in favor of
an excess carrier against a primary carrier for a wrongful failure to
settle a claim against the insured. Although an insured in such a
case is only required to prove negligence in Texas, it would be more
equitable to require an excess carrier to prove bad faith on the part
of the primary carrier. Where the evidence shows a refusal of an
offer to settle within the policy limits, the primary carrier should be
liable for the entire excess verdict where there was a strong
probability of an adverse verdict against the insured in excess of the
Supp. 384, 393 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (rejecting defensive issue on excess carrier's bad faith refusal to contribute to settlement).
100. See Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 152 Tex. 534, 534-35, 260
S.W.2d 884, 886 (1953).
101. See Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744, 746,
123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1975).
102. See Gibbs v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1976); Samson
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 636 P. 2d 32, 43, 178 Cal. Rptr. 343, 353-54 (Cal. 1981).
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primary limits. When there is no offer to settle within the primary
policy limits, the primary carrier may have a duty to initiate a negotiation for a settlement. Upon its wrongful failure to negotiate a
settlement the primary carrier may be liable to the excess carrier for
the difference between what was actually paid and what should have
been paid had there been a settlement before the verdict. In this
regard, it should be a defense if the primary carrier can show that
the excess carrier would not have contributed sufficient funds to settle the case. The excess carrier's contributory negligence and/or
failure to mitigate damages should be defensive issues.. Since the
cause of action is based upon equitable subrogation, the equitable
maxims and defenses should be asserted where appropriate. The
adoption of these principles will provide a balanced approach to
resolving these complex issues arising in disputes involving the policy holder, the primary carrier, and the excess carrier.
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